The problem we are discussing has many aspects.

Le système des sciences ne peut être globale qu'à la condition d'incorporer non seulement les sciences fondamentales mais aussi les sciences techniques et appliquées. Pour expliquer cette incorporation nous proposons de tenir compte non Seulement du moment objectif mais aussi du moment subject. En répondant aux questions: qu'est-ce qu'on étudie?, comment on étudie? pour quel but on étudie? nous découvrons l'accroissement de la proportion du moment subjectif ce qui permets à dresser un système globale des sciences.

In Alfred Ayer's article, philosophy is sharply counterposed to science, is denied the status of a science. This is the leitmotif of his entire paper. Moreover, the defense of this conception is characteristic of many representatives of neopositivism who go along with Ayer. However, Ayer has certain distinctive ideas of his own, which require critical analysis. Fundamental among them is his acknowledgment of the extremely general character of the concepts and principles with which philosophy, as distinct from the special sciences, (...) operates. This universality which is the distinguishing characteristic of philosophy is then transformed into an argument against the recognition of philosophy as a science. In replying to Ayer we shall attempt to demonstrate that his acknowledgment by no means necessitates the elimination of philosophy from the list of the sciences, but merely emphasizes its distinctive, that is, its general character, in contrast to all other sciences, which are particular in nature. This is the theme of the present article. (shrink)

The question of the unity of scientific knowledge, including that of the unity of the natural sciences and the humanities , occupies an important place in the writings of Marx. As a consistent materialist, Marx demonstrated that the connection among the sciences was based on an objective connection among the phenomena of nature and society. This outlook provides the key to discovering the unity of the sciences in our own day. Let us see how Marx posed that question, and how (...) it stands today. (shrink)

To help people study Marxist-Leninist philosophy, it is particularly necessary to be careful about the accuracy of philosophical terminology. Vague and ambiguous expressions must be firmly eliminated. Among them, in our view, is the saying, current among us, to the effect that "the world as a whole" is the subject matter of philosophy, Marxist philosophy included. The present article is devoted to criticism of that view.

It has long become established practice, on the part of the editors of Voprosy filosofii, to hold round table discussions on various pressing problems of philosophy and related disciplines.

1. As always, before beginning a discussion it is necessary to settle on the concepts with which one will operate. In the present instance we will be concerned not only with the concept of determinism, but with others associated with or correlative to it: law, causality, necessity, etc. Obviously, within the limits of a brief paper we can deal only with the most basic features.

We know that the Philosophical Notebooks do not constitute a finished work, but are working digests done by Lenin, not for publication but only for himself, and as a basis for further work on questions of dialectics. This circumstance must always be remembered when one turns to the Philosophical Notebooks. Here are recorded and collected Lenin's remarkable thoughts as they developed upon reading the works of Hegel and other philosophers as well as certain natural scientists, and Lenin's exceedingly valuable plans (...) and notions pertaining to further work on theoretical problems of the materialist dialectic. But, at the same time, the Philosophical Notebooks contain numerous passages copied by Lenin as he did the digests of the philosophical works he read. Moreover, it is sometimes difficult to say for what purpose and toward what end Lenin did this copying: was it in order subsequently to adduce these extracts and quotations in support of his own views and postulates; was it for purposes of criticism — to demonstrate that the propositions of Marxist dialectics were incompatible with them; or was it merely as the roughest kind of material for work he would subsequently do? Many of the copied extracts in the Philosophical Notebooks are accompanied by Lenin's critical remarks, negative and positive, in brief analyses and rather extensive commentaries. But some of them remained open questions for Lenin himself. In such an instance he noted for his own information that it would be necessary to return again to the proposition he had copied, because it was something that he did not fully understand: it seemed to him that at the given point Hegel wished to say this or that; but perhaps that is not the case. (shrink)

Philosophers and natural scientists are both familiar with the fact that, nearly a century ago, Engels undertook to synthesize the findings of natural science in his day from the standpoint of materialist dialectics. But few know the price Engels paid, how many times the work approached completion but was, for various reasons, postponed again and again until his death. In his mind, what place was his Dialectics of Nature to have occupied in the overall system of Marxist theory? This is (...) the question to which I devote the present article. But before offering an answer, it is necessary to trace, albeit briefly, the history of this book — how it was conceived by Engels, how work on it progressed, how it was broken off, and how the incomplete manuscript came down to us. (shrink)

There can be no doubt that the process of differentiation of the sciences today is going forward with rising intensity. This process is expressed in two ways: in the appearance of new sciences and disciplines outside those already existing, and as the further subdivision of existing sciences into narrower and more fragmented disciplinary branches.

Discoveries in natural science may be described concisely as a general procedure for finding the new in nature, in its phenomena, or in their essence.

Profound revolutionary changes occur periodically in the historical development of science. They take place when the system of scientific views previously in existence breaks down, and a new system adequate to the higher level of scientific knowledge takes shape. The discoveries of Copernicus, Lavoisier, Darwin, and many others have opened such periods of change in natural science. In modern physics, the discoveries of radium and the electron, the emergence of the theory of relativity and of quantum mechanics, have brought about (...) a revolution which has not yet run its course. (shrink)

The question of contacts between philosophers and historians of natural science, of mutual assistance and collaboration in their work, is an exceptionally important one from both the theoretical and practical points of view. This constitutes an organic component of the overall task, posed by Lenin, of strengthening the alliance between the leading natural scientists and Marxist philosophers. Here a businesslike approach is particularly needed. Lenin's behests lay in two directions. First, they have to do with the treatment of problems in (...) the history of knowledge from the standpoint of philosophy, and, second, they deal with the treatment of problems of dialectical philosophy on the basis of generalization from the data of the history of natural science. The two problems are interrelated, but they can also be considered as relatively independent. The common dialectical foundation of both sets of problems is the idea of the unity, the interconnection, of the historical and the logical. What are the behests of Lenin, and how are they being carried out? (shrink)

The question of a new journal and the philosophical debate of 1947 In 1922-43 Soviet philosophers had their own journal titled Pod znamenem marksizma [Under the Banner of Marxism]. It came into being in early 1922 and its third issue contained Lenin's programmatic article "On the Significance of Militant Materialism" [O znachenii voinstvuiushchego materializma]. This journal published many good combative articles in its twenty years. But during the War it fell ill and in mid-1943 ceased to exist. It was not (...) discontinued. No, it simply lacked the strength to appear. Thereafter, we Soviet philosophers did not have our own journal for several years. The lack was felt especially keenly after the end of the Great Patriotic War when philosophical studies developed quickly in our country. A wide discussion of philosophical questions, especially contentious, controversial questions—and there were quite a few of them—became necessary but there was no forum for discussing them. This was also true of the critical analysis of the philosophical literature that was coming out: a rare review appeared from time to time in the existing journals, but it was clearly inadequate and, most importantly, it did not give a comprehensive evaluation of the merits and shortcomings of the published philosophical work. It seemed to us then that an unhealthy situation such as the one involving G. F. Aleksandrov's book The History of Western European Philosophy [Istoriia zapadnoevropeiskoi filosofii], which was not evaluated on its merits and, despite its serious flaws, was praised by admirers of the author's talent, could only arise in the absence of a philosophical journal. Had there been a journal, it could have helped to prevent such stuffy situations from arising in certain sections of the philosophical front. Obviously, this opinion was quite naive: at the time many of us did not understand that if Aleksandrov had had "his" man on the journal, no criticism of his book would have been permitted. We realized this later. (shrink)

For the past two decades, matters biological have been given constant attention in our press - not only in specialized publications of natural science but in those aiming at the very broadest range of readers. After the meeting of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences in 1948, biological questions were arbitrarily converted into problems of the most purely political nature, and the struggle against dissenters was waged in this field with no less bitterness and with essentially the same means and (...) techniques as in the field of politics. There was the same attaching of derogatory labels for holding nonconforming views, the same reprisals against spokesmen for independent trends in science, the same persecution of honest people whose sole "guilt" lay in their disagreement with the views of Academician Lysenko and his followers, who called themselves "Michurinists." It sufficed merely to name a scientist - not even in the field of biology - a Morgan-Weismann-Mendelian, for the need to support the accusations against him with scientific argumentation automatically to disappear, while the individual who had been accused of the deadly sin of Morgan-Weismann-Mendelianism was immediately and just as automatically deprived of the opportunity to defend his views, prove them, or offer facts or theoretical arguments of whatever nature in support of them. In those melancholy times, it sufficed to label an honest man an enemy of the people to do away with him once and for all. The struggle in biology was a mirror image of what was then occurring throughout the land and was later defined as the cult of the individual, of Stalin. (shrink)

The discovery of spectrum analysis occupies an important place on the long and thorny path of the advance of human knowledge toward the atoms, the stars, and the mastery of their laws. This great discovery was made one hundred years ago . The decisive role in this achievement belongs by right to two outstanding German scientists, Robert Bunsen and Gustav Kirchhoff. This discovery simultaneously opened the path into the atomic world, making it possible to judge the internal structure of atoms (...) from their optical properties, and into the world of heavenly bodies, the chemical composition of whose substances was first determined by means of spectrum analysis. All this led to an unprecedented expansion of the field of scientific knowledge both in the direction of the investigation of microscopic objects in nature and in that of the study of macro-objects. But the most remarkable thing was that in their development both these trends in research proved to be interrelated. The penetration of science into the field of the macro-cosmos was a direct consequence of its more profound penetration into the field of the micro-cosmos. In a word, this was one of the boldest of scientific achievements, one that enabled human reason to penetrate into the depths of the substance of the earth and the cosmos, to know its properties, its composition, and its laws. (shrink)

As it happened, I became acquainted with E.V. Il'enkov quite late, in the mid- or even the late 1960s. It was only a bit more than ten years before his death that I began to feel at home in his house, was able to visit without calling ahead, and was able to call him by his first name and the familiar "you"—that is, like many, many of not only his true friends but also like-minded thinkers, who became his close acquaintances, (...) most of whom justly considered themselves his pupils … The door would open wide, and Olia, Professor K.I. Salimova, Eval'd's wife and most devoted friend, not at all surprised by the unexpected guest and seemingly even quite happy at his arrival , would try first to draw him into the kitchen and feed him … which she more often than not succeeded in doing. I am not talking about myself: there were always many guests, and this is precisely how they arrived at the Il'enkovs' apartment. Recently, a critic in Literaturnaia gazeta recalled those whom he met in Eval'd's apartment in the 1960s: "This was a tight circle of like-minded thinkers," wrote the critic. "But some of them are no longer with us, while most are far away, beyond our borders." Obviously, he had not been in the house often or had forgotten things over the distance of years. There was no "circle," nor could there have been one—not with this host, not with his lifestyle and way of relating to people. I met a good hundred fine and various people in Eval'd's home: I.N. Korzhavin, V. Davydov, A. Meshcheriakov, S. Vinogradova, N. Dubinin, V. Zinchenko, A. Zinov'ev, Iu. Kamiakin, and … indeed, five pages would not be enough to list the quite famous and the not-quite-so-famous, simply ordinary people with no claim to fame. Nazym Khikmet, A.N. Leont'ev, and B.M. Kedrov were friends of the house … Ever new faces, figures, and words come to mind. I cannot forgive myself: once Eval'd Vasil'evich wanted to take me along to Iurii Liubimov's to read his play Neither God nor Tsar nor Hero … [Ni bog, ni tsar' i ni geroi], but I had some other business, something so important that I do not even remember now what it was, and it is probably not worth remembering. But most likely I was too timid to appear uninvited at the house of a person burning with creativity. The same thing happened with Galich … Eval'd liked especially his song about Zoshchenko. He did not sing it; he narrated it, but in such a way that tears always came to one's eyes. (shrink)

The author considers some essential problems of philosophical considerations of disciplinary classifications in sciences with the reference to some Russian science classification systems. He de­velops the working definition of science and some criteria which make it possible to understand the principles of these classifi­cations. He also observes some modern Russian approaches to the problem of disciplinary classification (in particular, Bonifatiy M. Kedrov’s approach). The author emphasizes some special as­pects of classifications in cognitive science, computer science, and biology.

What are conspiracy theories? And what, if anything, is epistemically wrong with them? I offer an account on which conspiracy theories are a unique way of holding a belief in a conspiracy. Specifically, I take conspiracy theories to be self-insulating beliefs in conspiracies. On this view, conspiracy theorists have their conspiratorial beliefs in a way that is immune to revision by counter-evidence. I argue that conspiracy theories are always irrational. Although conspiracy theories involve an expectation to encounter some seemingly disconfirming (...) evidence (allegedly planted by the conspirators), resistance to all counter- evidence cannot be justified on these grounds. (shrink)

In this paper I interrogate the notion of `debunking conspiracy theories’, arguing that the term `debunk’ carries with it pejorative implications, given that the verb `to debunk’ is commonly understood as `to show the wrongness of a thing or concept’. As such, the notion of `debunking conspiracy theories’ builds in the notion that such theories are not just wrong but ought to be shown as being wrong. I argue that we should avoid the term `debunk’ and focus on investigating conspiracy (...) theories. Looking at recent research work in epistemology on conspiracy theory, I argue that the best way to avoid talk of `debunking’ conspiracy theories is by working with a non-pejorative definition of `conspiracy theory’, and forming communities of inquiry which allow us to investigate the warrant of such theories without the prejudice associated with working with a pejorative definition. (shrink)

Is God's foreknowledge compatible with human freedom? One of the most attractive attempts to reconcile the two is the Ockhamistic view, which subscribes not only to human freedom and divine omniscience, but retains our most fundamental intuitions concerning God and time: that the past is immutable, that God exists and acts in time, and that there is no backward causation. In order to achieve all that, Ockhamists distinguish ‘hard facts’ about the past which cannot possibly be altered from ‘soft facts’ (...) about the past which are alterable, and argue that God's prior beliefs about human actions are soft facts about the past. (shrink)

This is the first of two companion articles drawn from a larger project, provisionally entitled Undisciplining Moral Epistemology. The overall goal is to understand how moral claims may be rationally justified in a world characterized by cultural diversity and social inequality. To show why a new approach to moral justification is needed, it is argued that several currently influential philosophical accounts of moral justification lend themselves to rationalizing the moral claims of those with more social power. The present article explains (...) how discourse ethics is flawed just in this way. The article begins by identifying several conditions of adequacy for assessing reasoning practices designed to achieve moral justification and shows that, when used in contexts of cultural diversity and social inequality, discourse ethics fails these conditions. It goes on to argue that the failure of discourse ethics is rooted in its reliance on a broader conception of moral epistemology that is invidiously idealized. It concludes by pointing to the need to rethink both the mission and the method of moral epistemology. (shrink)